Especially over the past 5 years, we came across many frauds, and some were done so professionally that we were not able to detect early and in the end, we lost money.
In this page, we share some of the complicated frauds we have uncovered, which most of the times, were discovered through very painful, lengthy and expensive experience, with the “education fee” above US$11m.
In this page, we have listed the frauds we have uncovered. For the more complicated frauds and where we spent significant time and funds into them, we will share the full details so geunuine business people can learn from our lessons and avoid them or their likes.
The biggest lesson we learned is from Barclays (Barley) Ltd. Check out the story yourself. For the other stories, we will work on it and share the stories in near future. We may take more time than usual as we need to proofread all contents and verify against the proofs we compiled.
In addition to the major and organised fraudsters, there are also many individuals who introduced themselves as agents, intermediaries or mandates. They have either promoted special products, promotions or created fake documents to convince our “investments”. We have listed some in the list under Fraud Alert list below. Beware of them.
We have compiled most of the documents under four categories: frauds, scams, imposters, non-performers in our Member’s Resource Library. If you are interested in gaining access to all the hundreds of documents and communication tracks (in PDF printouts) and related files, just join us as our member.
The Story We Are Currently writing…
Barclays (Barley) Ltd
Formerly is known as Barley Investments Ltd
To date, this is the most complicated fraud case we have uncovered. To complete the story, we have to cover the story in few chapters over multiple webpages. Start reading the story by clicking on this block.
The fraudulent organization used an authentic domain of a top-rating bank and its registered address even matches with the address filed in Company House, UK.
We had uncovered so much because we were very confident with our study of the company. But, we ended up losing the legal cost and even have to pay damages, because the fraudulent organization was able to hide behind a “big brother” with protection under the unfair UK legal systems.
(Click here to read the story we are writing)
Other Fraudulent Providers
Secure Platform Funding
Sadly, we were informed by a client that Secure Platform Funding had just cheated his money. Secure Platform Funding maintained a professional website with very convincing contents. In the website, it display a list of fraudulent companies, which are not 100% true.
But. the truth is this company is a fraudulent Provider! The list of Banned Assets and Providers cannot be trusted. For example, we have worked with Axios Credit Bank, Relius International Bank, etc. and the bank instruments were received by the receiving bank via SWIFT Messages or any channels requested by the Receiver.
Check out our email exchanges and documents with filenames precede with “SPF” in the Resource Library on Frauds. From the contract and email exchanges, the person behind Secure Platform Funding is Bruce Green.
Bruce Green sent invoice and his company details to receive payment. In our Resource Library, you will find the email dated on 13 Dec 2016, which we asked Bruce Green how Secure Platform Funding and himself were related to the many companies in the Addendums of the Agreement, which we were to make payment to. He kept quiet and never replied to our email.
We had also asked to meet as we were in London in Nov/Dec 2016. Bruce Green gave many excuses to meet us, claiming that he said he was very busy to meet as the amount of the SBLC we applied for was “too small”.
You can also google about the company and you will find them on many scammed lists. One of the websites is www.complaintsboard.com.
(Full story on the way…)
Another UK fraud who claimed to be a Provider of top rating banks. The company is owned by Phillipe Sinclair in his 70s.
This provider is supported by a very sophisticated IT fraud team. The IT team create SWIFT copies that look like real SWIFT messages, and they also phished emails from Deutsche banks.
In this deal, we could have lost over 1 million GBP but we were lucky to find the fraud report from a whistleblower and to receive prompt support from Deutsche Bank’s legal team in Singapore.
Fake Letter of Credit
After signing the contract with us, which requires the payment of the charges for bank instrument by cash, the client requested to pay through a L/C (Letter of Credit).
We agreed to the request. However, to our alarm, the client sent a fake LC and demanded us to issue the bank instrument immediately!
Luckily we ignore the request, and examine the L/C that was issued to us, and found that it was a fake L/C.
All the communications and documents are compiled in the Resource Library on Frauds. The filenames precede with “FakeLC”.
This company is similar to Barclays Barley Ltd. Like Barley and the rest of the 200 companies, the registered address is at Barclays Bank’s main London address.
In July 2019, we were approached by George Tenet (firstname.lastname@example.org), who later introduced us to the director, Oliver Junker. Check out the email address of Oliver Junker.
When our Compliance Team noticed the many similarities (same registered address, similar documents, etc.) between this company and Barclays Barley Ltd, we became suspicious. When we questioned their relationships with Barclays Barley Ltd, they stopped communication.
Documents and communication exchanges are added in the Member Resource Center.
Fraudulent Agents / Intermediaries / Solicitors
JRG JOHNSS BOSS (Agent)
All related documents have filenames preceding with “Roger-” in the Resource Library.)
His full name is Jean Roger S.L. Bosmans. He is from Belgium but was staying in UK when we knew him. His company name is Global Tradersegate Anakwae Ltd.
This man basically tells all sorts lies. We first got to know him when he contacted us as a Whistleblower. We thought he was honest.
Unfortunately, it was a trick. He claimed he had good Providers and Monetizers, and collected fees from us. He claimed he had paid the Providers, Monetizers and other agents. But, he was never able to provide receipts. Our advice is to avoid work with him.
Lee Hack Hyung (Agent)
We verified with a UK Solicitor who confirmed that he did not notarize the document sent by this fraudster, Lee Hack Hyung (Skype ID: hack.hyung38; Email: email@example.com).
The joke was Hack Hyung must had thought that Barley was a genuine provider and so he imitated the documents from Barley.
Unfortunately for him, when our Compliance Team noticed that he was using Gmail account, they contacted the Notary Public in the ICRU document, and the solicitor confirmed that he did not sign the document.
Lee Hack Hyung was still arguing that the contract he sent was authentic until I told him the feedback from the solicitor. He immediately back out.
In 2018, Hack Hyung sent us a Skype Message to sell bank instrument. This means that he is still active and there are victims lost their hard-earned money to him.
(Full story on the way…)
The picture above is Bruce Shedden, who has been the key contact of this investment program which one of our Directors had invested into. He is the Power of Attorney for Safekeeping Investment S.A., a company registered in Seychelles.
Since 2015, he made up many stories to “explain” why the investments still need more time to. He created stories to blame Roger from Astrum Financial Services, registered in Canada for non-performance. But, up to now, we have not being able to reach Roger.
We are also unable to confirm if the money we sent to the escrow account in The Bank of Nova Scotin, Canada is still in the account.
Hallows Associates (Solicitor)
Hallows Associates was run by Mr. Richard Clive Hallows, who was a Senior Associate with over 20 years of experience. With the long years of experience, we did not had second thought to deposit funds into his law firm’s escrow account.</id=”hallows”>
When we met him in person, he was quite a decent “gentleman”. We believed it was greed that cost his career and reputation. He was introduced by an agent, Andrew Tate, who was introduced by Mr. Tanjr Sugar (email: firstname.lastname@example.org ) and Sir Sam Malin. Andrew Tate (email: email@example.com) presented an investment program that required us to pay a deposit GBP 550k (£550,000.00) to Hallows Associates’ escrow account, and an advance fee of GBP 50k to the 3 introducers: Andrew Tate, Tanjir, Sir Robert.
When the deal did not perform, Mr. Hallows helped us to take legal action against Sir Malin to refund us the fee he received, but refused to do the same for Mr. Andrew Tate. He said he Mr. Tate was his friend… Well, at least Mr. Hallows was a loyal friend.
P/S: To date, only Sir Malin had returned us the fee, Andrew Tate and Tanjir Sugar had not. Tanjir had borrowed more money but did not return.
Fraudulent Individuals (Agents)
Beware of the following individuals who introduced themselves as agents, intermediaries or mandates, offering products and programs that will require you to pay an upfront payment. In the list below, we only have their names, email and skype IDs but no pictures about them.
Kelvin claimed that he had helped us to open a bank account in Natwest in UK. After we remitted fund, he gave a lot of excuses why time was needed to reflect the balance in the account.
But, in the end, we understood the account under another name and was closed. The fund remitted there was withdrawn. He went missing after that.
Check out related files preceding with “KL” in the Resource Library on Scam.
Gaurav worked with Kelvin Li to introduce the Natwest Program. They setup a bank account in Natwest. When we transferred the money to Natwest in London, they created many fake stories to delay us from recalling fund.
After 1-2 weeks, when Natwest finally responded to our request to discuss, we were told the money we deposited were gone.
Andrew was introduced to us by Tanjir Sugar and Sir Malin. He introduced himself as an accountant and lived in Isle of Mann.
Together with Hallows, he introduced a few investment offers and created fraudulent documents to justify for us to deposit funds into Hallows’ Escrow Account.
Check out related files preceding with “AT” in the Resource Library on Fraud.
Marco has been in the market offering bank instruments as an agent. Recently, we approached us to offer fraudulent BG/ SBLC from another Barclays Bank’s subsidiary, like the one we experienced with Barclays (Barley) Ltd.
Email: firstname.lastname@example.org /email@example.com
Khosro likes to broadcast his offers using the different email addresses When we requested to unsubscribe from his list, he refused. We blocked his email, and he just created other emails and spam our mailboxes.
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